The online travel market was recently affected by the appearance of new firms, like hotwire.com or priceline.com, which sell hotel rooms, airplane tickets and car rentals through innovative lottery-like mechanisms. In this paper we examine the use of lotteries over substitutes goods under different market structures. We first show that a monopolist that sells two substitute goods uses lotteries over these goods to price discriminate amongst the consumers. We characterize the monopolist's optimal selling mechanism and we show how the probability distribution of the lotteries depend on the buyers' preferences.
Introduction
Recently the appearance of innovative websites like hotwire.com or priceline.com has affected the online travel market. The impact of these new players on the market is interesting because of the peculiar products they offer. Consider, for instance, how Hotwire operates in the market for hotel rooms. In addition to from the standard menu of hotel rooms and respective prices, Hotwire provides the option of paying a lower price for a room in a hotel whose identity is not revealed until after the payment is made. The only information consumers have to decide whether to accept this "blind offer" is the category of the hotel and the area where it is located. In other words, consumers can choose to pay less for an uncertain outcome. This mechanism can be described as a lottery whose prizes are the different hotel rooms that match the specified hotel category and location. 1 This innovative selling strategy has been applied successfully in the markets for hotel rooms, 1 The mechanism used by priceline.com is more complex. The consumer selects the hotel category and the area he is interested in. Then the consumer makes a bid that may be accepted or refused by a hotel that fits the charachteristics specified. Still the mechanism can be interpreted as requiring the consumer to select a lottery and bid for it.
airplane tickets 2 and rental cars 3 , and can potentially be exported to many other markets with substitute goods. In this paper we examine the use of lotteries over substitutes goods as a mechanism to price discriminate amongst the consumers under different market structures. First, we examine the use of lotteries by a monopolist that sells substitute goods. Then, we assume that each substitute good is produced by a different firm. In this case we find conditions under which third party intermediaries can sell lotteries over the different firms' goods. Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) were the first to examine the use of lotteries as an attempt to screen consumers. They look at a single good monopolist that attempts to price discriminate amongst the consumers based on the probability of delivering the good. They show that the optimal selling strategy does not include lotteries. In contrast to Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) , we consider lotteries over multiple goods where the uncertainty is about which particular good is delivered and not about whether any good is delivered.
This type of lottery can be seen as a mechanism to screen consumers with strong preferences for a particular good from consumers that are relatively indifferent among the different substitute goods.
In this paper, we use the linear city model with a general transportation costs function to represent a market with two horizontally differentiated goods. We show that the multiproduct monopolist optimal selling strategy involves the use of lotteries (in addition to selling each good with certainty). Interestingly, consumers who buy these lotteries always get one of the goods.
ing strategy includes just one lottery, where the consumer has equal probability of getting each good. Instead, if the transportation costs function is convex, the optimal selling strategy includes selling a continuum of type contingent lotteries.
Then we examine the case of an oligopoly market where each substitute good is produced by a different firm. In this context, we find conditions for an intermediary to sell lotteries of the substitute goods. With two firms, this happens if and only if the presence of the intermediary makes both firms weakly better off. The reason for this is that with just two firms, each of them can block the creation of the lottery. We define two different cases depending on whether the market is fully covered or not. A market is fully covered market if in equilibrium, in the absence of lotteries, all consumers buy one good. In this case the introduction of lotteries make the firms worse off and hence lotteries are not sold in equilibrium. Intuitively, firms prefer not to sell the good through lotteries because the benefit of better price discrimination between consumers is more than offset by the increased competitive pressure resulting from the presence of lotteries in the market.
However, when the market is not fully covered 5 , using lotteries has the added benefit of allowing firms to sell to additional consumers. We show that in this case lotteries can used in equilibrium.
With more than two firms, the results change substantially. In this case, lotteries can be sold even if firms were better off without the presence of the intermediary. With more than two firms, each individual firm no longer has the power to veto the creation of a lottery since a lottery can always be created with the substitute goods produced by other firms. We show that, in this case, lotteries can also be sold when the market is fully covered. 5 In appendix we design a mechanism that allows the intermediary to enter the market even when it is fully covered. We let the intermediary to redistribute the revenues collected from the lottery according to shares that may differ from the probability with which the customers win the different firms' goods. In that way, we show that an intermediary can make both firms better off bringing them closer to the perfect cartel outcome. McAfee and Mcmillan (1988) extend the result of Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) to the multiproduct monopolist case using a multi-characteristics consumer model. They consider the case of two goods and, under specific conditions on the consumers' preferences, they show that lotteries don't increase the monopolist's profit. Thanassoulis (2004) , in a setting with two goods and two dimensional types, provides some counterexamples in which the monopolist is able to increase its profits by selling lotteries. Pavlov (2006) reaches independently results similar to ours for the monopolist case, even though he considers a different setting. The main difference is that he keeps constant the utility function of the customers and changes the distribution of the types. Instead, we keep constant the distribution of the types and change the utility specification. Our work is also complementary to a growing literature that analyzes the role of internet intermediaries as match-makers (Caillaud and Jullien (2003) , Julien (2001) and Rochet and Tirole (2003) ). The focus of these studies are the efficiency gains provided by the appearance of such intermediaries, and their "chicken and egg" problem of persuading both sides of the market (sellers and buyers) to use it.
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 we set up the basic model. The multiproduct monopolist's optimal selling strategy is discussed in section 3. In section 4 we examine the possibility of lotteries being offered in markets of oligopolistic competition. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.
Model
We consider a Hotelling model of horizontal differentiation. There are two goods, indexed by i = {A, B}, located at the two endpoints of a segment [0, 1]. The marginal cost of producing each good is identical and -without loss of generality -is assumed to be equal to zero. First, we assume that both goods are sold by a multiproduct monopolist. Then, we consider the duopoly case in which each good is sold by a different firm. Firm A located in point 0 sells good A and firm B, located in point 1, sells good B.
There is a continuum of consumers with unit demand. We assume that the consumers are distributed uniformly along the segment. Each consumer's preference over the goods A and B is represented as a function of his location on the segment, which is private information.
A consumer located in x, with x ∈ [0, 1], has the following utility from
where p A is the price of good A, V is a positive constant value, and c (x) is a generic transportation cost function. We assume that c (·) and c (·) are continuous functions, c(0) = 0, and c (x) > 0 6 . Similarly, if he buys good B, his utility is
If a consumer does not buy any good, he gets utility 0. We assume first that V is high enough so that firms want to sell to all consumers.
Monopoly
In this section, we consider a monopolist selling two horizontal differentiated goods, A and B. We divide the segment [0, 1] in two sub-segments, 0, , 1 . We consider the profit maximization over the second sub-segment. The profit maximizing solution for the first sub-segment is symmetric.
Applying the Direct Revelation Principle, without loss of generality we can restrict to consider direct mechanisms, where each consumer reveals his location x to a fictitious mediator who then selects an outcome for him. The set of feasible outcomes we consider includes stochastic outcomes. We define an outcome as a combination of a probability q of getting good A, probability 1 − q of getting good B and a corresponding price, p (q). We refer to these probabilistic outcomes as lotteries. 7 The profit maximization problem of firm B can be formalized in the following way
The program is subject to the individual rationality constraint, and incentive compatibility constraint of each consumer. The solution to the problem turns out to depend on the shape of the transportation cost function.
Concave Transportation Costs
In this section we solve the optimal selling strategy when the transportation costs are concave. In each half of the segment, the monopolist sells to consumers either their most favorite good or lotteries where they get their most favorite good with probability weakly higher than 1 2 . When the transportation costs are concave this model becomes like a standard model of price discrimination where consumers can be ranked from the lowest type, in the middle of the segment, until the highest type, at the extreme of the 7 To simplify the problem we don't allow the monopolist to offer lotteries where consumers have a positive probability of getting no good. We can use the Riley and Zeckhauser's result to show that such a strategy is not optimal. If such a lottery were to be used, it would be because the benefit of decreasing the informational rents more than compensated the cost of selling this lottery at a lower price (due to the positive probability of getting no good). Notice that both the benefit and the cost are proportional to the probability. Hence, the probability of getting no good is either zero or one. We assume that V is high enough so that the firm wants to sell to all consumers. . There is a x * ∈ ( 
. Where x * is given by the following condition
Proof. Consider consumers in the sub-segment 1 2 , 1 of the segment of length one. Let W (x) be the utility of consumer x
Where U(x, q(y)) is the utility that consumer of type x derives from lottery q(y). By the envelope theorem, the derivative of W (x) with respect to x takes into account only the direct effect of
To apply the Mirrlees' technique [6] , we need the utility W (x) to be an increasing function of x. This requires that
Given that x ≥ and c(·) is concave, we necessarily have that c (1 − x) ≥ c (x). This implies
where
. We show in the appendix A that in the optimal mechanism we must have q ≤ . Therefore, we necessarily have that
Hence W (x) is increasing in x. Integrating equation (4), we get
By the individual rationality constraint of type (2) and rearranging the terms, we can express each price as
We can reformulate the monopolist's problem as
If we integrate by parts the last term we obtain that the last term
Hence, expression (7) becomes
The maximization of π with respect to the schedule q (.) requires the term under the integral to be maximized with respect to each q (x) for any x.
Taking the first order conditions we get
Expression (8) does not depend on q. Hence, for each type x it is either positive or negative. If it is positive, the optimal solution is to assign to type x a lottery with the highest possible probability q, q = . If it is negative, the solution is q = 0. Setting equation (8) equal to zero, we can determine the threshold value x * .
In the optimal mechanism, types with x ≥ x * get their most preferred good (good B) for sure (lottery with q = 0); while types with x < x * get a lottery
. Notice that at
, the left side of the equation (9) is smaller than the right side of the equation, (
. For x * = 1 the right side of the equation (9) is smaller than the left side (since c(x
given that c and c are continuous functions, by the Bolzano's theorem, there is a solution x * in the segment 1 2 , 1 . We can solve in a similar way the problem for the sub-segment 0, 
.
Once we have determined that the optimal mechanism is a set of three lotteries, q = is pinned down by the individual rationality constraint of the lowest type,
The price p B (or p A ) is determined by making the incentive compatibility constraint of type x = x * (or x = 1 − x * ) binding
When the transportation costs are concave, consumers closer to the extremes of the segment attribute a higher value to a lottery with probability . Those consumers also have a higher valuation of their favorite good than the more indifferent consumers. Hence, we can think of consumers closer to the extreme of the segment as the high types and consumers closer to middle of the segment as the low types. We show that in this case the multiproduct monopolist optimal selling strategy is to sell only one lottery with probabil-
. This result is in stark contrast with the no lottery result for a single product monopolist in Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) .
The intuition is as follows. Consider first the single product monopolist case. For all consumers, the expected utility of a lottery with probability q < 1 is proportionally lower than the utility of getting the good for sure. In contrast, in the multiproduct monopolist case, a lottery with probability q < 1 of getting one of the substitute goods (and 1 − q of getting the other good) has an expected utility that is proportionally much lower for consumers with strong preference for that good. In the limit, for a consumer indifferent between the substitute goods a lottery provides the utility as getting each of the goods for sure. Interestingly, the single lottery result with concave costs can be seen as extension of the no lottery result of Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) to the multiproduct case. When the transportation costs are concave, all consumers derive a higher utility of a lottery with probability Intuitively, we can think as if the monopolist sells a lottery with probability 1 2 to all consumers. Then, on top of this, he sells to some consumers an additional option of trading the lottery for their favorite good. Offering to deliver this extra option with probability q, on top of a lottery with probability 1 2 of getting each good, is formally equivalent to offering a lottery with probability q + (1 − q) 1 2 of getting each of the two goods. Notice that in each half of the segment line, the demand for this option can be seen as the demand of a single good monopolist. Consumers located at the extreme of the segment have the highest willingness to pay for this extra option, while the consumer located at x = 1 2 is willing to pay zero. Here, we can apply the Riley and Zeckhauser [7] result to show that the monopolist does not offer lotteries of this extra option. Hence, we can conclude that q = 0. Hence, the optimal selling strategy is to offer only one lottery with probability 
Convex Costs
When the transportation costs are convex it is no longer true that consumers at the extreme of the segments attribute a higher value to the lottery q = than consumers closer to the middle of the segment. Hence, we can no longer classify consumers as high value or low value consumers. Furthermore, we can no longer apply the Mirrlees' [6] integration by parts technique because when c (x) is convex condition (5) do not necessarily holds.
The following proposition describes the monopolist's optimal mechanism when the transportation costs are convex. for any
are sold at prices p (q) = V + q + q 2 . x * is given by the following
Proof. We show in Appendix A that there is a intermediate region where both IR and IC constraints bind. From the local IC constraints we obtain
The IR constraints are given by
Both conditions determine a sequence of lotteries and corresponding prices
To determine the optimal mechanism, we restrict our analysis to the half-
, 1 8 and we proceed through three stages: first, we show that the local IC constraint has to bind for all types and the IR constraint has to bind for at least one type; second, we prove that, given that f is convex, if the IR constraint binds for a type x * * , in the optimal mechanism it has to bind for all types x ≤ x * * ; third, we determine x * * , the threshold type such that, in the optimal mechanism, all x < x * * buy the type contingent lottery q (x) at price p (x), and all type x > x * * buy good B at price
Competition
We now consider the case of two competing firms, A and B, each selling only one good. In addition to selling their goods separately, firms have also the possibility of selling them through a lottery organized by external intermediaries. 9 If a firm decides to join the lottery, it provides its good as a prize. We consider lotteries in which both firms participate and consumers get each good with probability 1 2 . Our main goal is to examine whether this lottery is provided in equilibrium. Notice that consumers only buy a lottery if its price is lower than the price of the goods, otherwise they prefer to buy their favorite good. Hence, an intermediary needs the agreement of the firms to be able to sell the goods through the lottery at a lower price. We assume that the intermediaries have no cost of organizing lotteries and that there is perfect competition among lottery providers. This implies that selling the good through a lottery has no additional costs to the firms. Since we assume that the intermediaries are competitive, consumers only consider the lowest price lottery ticket within the set of lotteries offered in the market. Then, we argue that our results can be extended to the case where the lottery providers have market power and charge firms a commission on the goods sold through 8 Same analysis has to be repeated for the complementary sub-segment 0, 1 2 . 9 The lotteries could also be organized by the two firms.
the lottery.
The timing of the game is as follows. At time t = 1, each firm declares the set of prices at which it is willing to sell its good through the lottery. Lotteries are offered in the market only at prices at which both firms accepted to provide their goods as prizes. At time t = 2, after learning which lotteries are offered in the market, firms simultaneously choose the prices at which to sell their respective goods separately. Finally, at time t = 3 consumers make the purchasing decisions.
We consider two distinct cases. First, we examine a market where all consumers buy the good in the equilibrium with no lotteries. We say that this market is fully covered. Then, we consider a market where some consumers don't buy the good in equilibrium. We show that lotteries are only provided when the market is not fully covered. In this case, the introduction of lotteries leads to an increase in the quantity sold in equilibrium.
Fully Covered Market
First, we consider a market where no lotteries are provided. Following Hotelling [3] , we obtain the following proposition Proposition 3 If the market is fully covered, in the symmetric equilibrium the firms' optimal prices are given by
We now introduce the possibility of intermediaries to resell the goods of the firms through lottery at a price p L . We may expect that the duopolist firms, as the monopolist firm, would want to use the lottery as a tool to price discriminate consumers. Interestingly, we show that, under general conditions, this is not the case. In a market with two firms, there is no equilibrium where the firms accept to sell their goods through the lottery.
Proposition 4
If the price of the lottery and the price of each good are strategic complements, a lottery where consumers get each of the two goods with equal probability is not offered in equilibrium. Furthermore, prices are strategic complements if the following condition is verified
Condition (11) is verified by most well behaved transportation cost functions. For example, linear, quadratic and square root functions satisfy this condition. 10 Proof. Let p L denote the price of the lottery. A consumer is indifferent between buying good A directly from the seller and buying the lottery if
Demand for good A is given by
To show that no lottery is offered in equilibrium, we first assume the most favorable lottery to the firms. The lottery is either offered by a competitive intermediary with no commission charged, C = 0, or, alternatively, firms are able to organize the lottery between themselves at no cost. In both cases, 10 Intuitively, this condition imposes that the relative value of g −1 (·) cannot be too high. This avoids that the demand of the firm becomes very inelastic as the demand decreases. This guarantees that the firm does not want to increase its price when its demand falls in response to a decrease in the lottery price.
firms split in two the profits from the lottery. Firm A maximizes
The optimal price of firm A, given the lottery price p L is
We show in appendix C that no lotteries are implemented in equilibrium
. Suppose that an intermediary offers to sell a lottery with probability 1 2 of getting each good i = {A, B} at a price equal to the equilibrium price in the market with no lottery,
11 . Substituting p L in equation (13) we obtain that firms charge the same price as the lottery
. Hence, if the intermediary sells a lottery at
, the lottery would have no demand. Consider now the case in which the intermediary sells a lottery at a lower price p L <
, each firm's price and the price of the lottery are strategic complements. Hence, if the agent sets a lower price than
, each firm would decrease its price as well. This results in a drop in the industry profits. Therefore, at time t=1, firms would refuse to sell their goods sell through the lottery. If the agent instead chooses to set a price above
, the firms' optimal reaction, in case they both accept the lottery at time t=1, is to choose a price equal to
. 12 Again, in equilibrium, the lottery has no demand. Consider now the case in which the lottery is provided by a intermediary with market power. Suppose this intermediary charges a commission C for each unit of the good sold through the lottery. In this case, the firms' optimal price, for a given lottery price, is weakly lower than in the case where no commission is charged. Hence, the lottery would have no demand.
In conclusion, firms don't take advantage of the lottery to better price discriminate among consumers, charging high value consumers a high price and letting low value consumers to buy the lottery at a low price. The proof relies on the fact that the lottery has zero demand when a lottery is introduced with the same price as the one firms charge without lottery. Intuitively, the lottery has two effects on firms' prices that offset each other. On the one hand, half of the profits of the lottery belong to each firm. This decreases by half the cost associated with losing each consumer when firms increase their price. On the other hand, a lottery is a closer substitute to good A than is good B. This makes firms' demand twice as elastic as without lottery. Hence, when the firm increases its price it loses twice as many consumers as without lottery. Since this second effect perfectly offsets the first effect, the firms' prices don't change when the lottery is introduced. Therefore, the lottery has zero demand in equilibrium.
Market Not Fully Covered
In this section, we consider the case in which some consumers do not purchase the good in equilibrium in a market without lotteries. We show, as opposed to the case of the fully covered market, that intermediaries can successfully sell lotteries of the two goods. In this case, the introduction of lotteries, by improving consumer screening, leads to an increase in the number of consumers that purchase the good. We focus on the case of the concave transportation costs function and the possibility of introducing a lottery with probability 1 2 of getting each good. In the Hotelling model, a market is not fully covered if the value V , that enters in the consumers' utility function is low when compared with the transportation costs. In this case consumers located close to the middle of the segment do not buy any good in equilibrium. The equilibrium with no lotteries is the following
The market is not fully covered if V < V * , where V * is defined as
Consider now that a third agent sells a lottery with probability
at a price p L . We consider the case in which the lottery is offered at no cost by a competitive intermediary and is set at a price that maximizes the firms' profits. To simplify the problem we assume that V is high enough, V > V * * , so that it is optimal to sell to all consumers when the lottery is introduced.
Proposition 6
If V * * < V < V * , the lottery price is
Firms' prices are p A = p B = p. Where p is determined by the following condition
Proof. The optimal lottery price is set to make the individual rationality constraint of the consumer located at x = 1 2 to bind. The firm A's optimal response to a given lottery price is given by equation (13) . If we replace p L using equation (14) we obtain condition (15)
Market with Three Firms
In a market with more than two firms the conditions under which intermediaries can sell lotteries over the substitute goods change significantly. In this case no firm holds a veto power on the creation of a lottery. Only two of the three firms are needed to organize a lottery. If a firm does not accept to join the lottery, it might still face a market where a lottery is sold. In this section, we give an example where firms join the lottery, even though their profit when they join the lottery is lower than the profit when lotteries are not allowed.
We first consider the standard Salop's circular city model, which can be seen as the extension of the linear city model for the case of more than two substitute goods. We assume that consumers are uniformly distributed along a circumference of length one and that the three goods are located on the circumference at equal distance between each other. For simplicity, we consider a model with just three goods, linear transportation costs and we consider lotteries in which consumers get each good with equal probability. As in the model of two firms of section 4, we assume that there is a competitive market of intermediaries. A lottery ticket is offered in the market at a given price if two or more firms accept to join a lottery at that price. Since we assume that the intermediaries are competitive, consumers only choose the lowest price lottery ticket within the lotteries over the same substitute goods. For simplicity we will rule out more complex types of contracts. In particular, we assume that firms cannot be excluded of joining any particular lottery.
The timing of the game is as follows. At time t = 1, each firm declares the set of prices at which it is willing to sell its good through the lottery. At time t = 2, after learning which lotteries are offered in the market, firms simultaneously choose the prices at which to sell their respective goods separately. Finally, at time t = 3 consumers make the purchasing decisions. Interestingly, we show in the appendix F that the results we obtained in the linear city model with two firms still hold when we consider the Salop model with three firms. Namely, lotteries are not sold in a fully covered market and firms are never worse off in the presence of lotteries. With three firms there are two possible types of lotteries: lotteries over three goods or, alternatively, lotteries over two goods. Consider first the case of lotteries over two goods. Notice that this case is very similar to linear city model since each firm can block the appearance of the lottery. Furthermore, each firm is not affected if a lottery over the other two firms' goods is offered. This is because that lottery does not provide effective competition to the firm that does not participate in the lottery. Hence, we obtain the same result as in the linear city model. Consider next a lottery over three goods with equal probability of getting each good. In the circular city model this type of lottery is very unattractive to all consumers. The reason for this is that the consumers who are potentially interested in a lottery are the ones that do not have a strong bias in favor of any specific good. (i.e. consumers located around the middle point between two firms). However, these consumers in the circular city model are also the ones that obtain the lowest utility from the third good. We show in the appendix that in the Salop model lotteries are not offered in equilibrium. Lotteries over the three goods are not sold in the Salop model because there are no consumers relatively indifferent among the three goods. This feature of the Salop model might be a good representation of markets where the goods are differentiated along one dimension. However, in many real world markets there are consumers who are indifferent among more than two substitute goods. Consider for example the market for hotels in Manhat-tan. We could assume, for simplicity, that there are two types of consumers: tourists and business travellers. The first type of consumer might be relatively indifferent among all the hotels of the same category, while the second type of consumer could have a strong preference for an hotel that is close to her business meeting. Lotteries over many goods are likely to be more attractive in this type of markets.
The random utility model is an alternative model of substitute goods where, as opposed to the salop model, there are consumes who are indifferent among more than two goods. However, this model is not tractable analytically when we introduced lotteries over the substitute goods.
For this reason we propose, instead, a simple modification of Salop's model in order to have consumers who are relatively indifferent among the three goods. Consider a consumer who is located on the segment between good A and good B. Let x measure the distance of this consumer to good A. As in Salop's model, the consumer's utility of consuming A and B is respectively V − xt and V − − x) t. However, we change the utility of consuming good C to the following expression:
Where k and h are constants, k ≥ 1 and h ≥ 0. 13 For simplicity we assume that t = 1.
In the modified salop (MS) model, good C is also the least preferred for consumers located between A and B. However, the consumers in this segment that don't have a strong preference for neither A nor B (x close to 1 6 ) are also the consumers that have a higher utility of consuming good C. Notice that if k=1 and h=0, then a consumer at the mid-point of segment AB, x=1/6, would be indifferent among the three goods.
We first consider the MS model in a market where lotteries are not allowed. Then, we compute the equilibrium in the case where competitive intermediaries can sell lotteries over the substitute goods.
Proposition 7
In the absence of lotteries, the equilibrium price and quantities in the MS and Salop models are the same if the following condition holds
Condition (16) guarantees that firms do not want to deviate and charge a lower price to obtain consumers located in the segment between the other two firms.
Proof. See appendix
Notice that the only difference between the standard Salop model and the MS model is on the utility of the least preferred good. However, in the neighborhood of a symmetric equilibrium only the utilities of the two most preferred goods, which is the same in both models, are used to compute firms' demand curve. Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium prices are the same in both models (see appendix).
Next we examine the MS model in a market where competitive intermediaries can sell lotteries over the substitute goods. In the first type of SPE lottery tickets are not sold in the market since less than two firms join the lottery. In the second type of SPE all the three firms join the lottery. Interestingly, firms may be worse off in this equilibrium than in the case where no firms join the lottery. Finally, we may have a SPE where just two firms join the lottery. We will briefly explain our results focusing on the first two types of SPE and leave the complete description of the results and the formal proofs to the appendix.
Consider first the equilibrium where no lottery tickets are sold in the market. The simplest case is when no firms accept to join the lottery. In this equilibrium the outcome is exactly the same as in the market where lotteries are not allowed. No firm has an incentive to deviate and join a lottery at any price p L , since lottery tickets will only be sold at time t=3 if two or mores firms accept to sell through the lottery.
Consider now the type of SPE where only lotteries tickets over the three goods are sold. In this lottery consumers have a 1/3 probability of obtaining each good. Consider for simplicity that firms' strategy is such that they accepted to sell the goods through the same lotteries. At time t = 3, each consumer has to decide whether to buy the lottery ticket or instead to buy a good directly from a producer. Notice that consumers only consider buying the lottery ticket with the lowest price, p L , among the lottery tickets that include the three firms.
A consumer located between A and B obtains the following expected utility from buying the lottery ticket with price p L :
We show in the appendix that the demand for each good is given by
The total demand for the lottery, which is equally divided among the three firms, is given
At time t = 2 each firm chooses its optimal price after learning that the other two firms also decided to sell the good through the lottery at price p L . Firm A problem is given by
We show in the appendix F that firm i's optimal price is given by
In the appendix F we prove that two conditions are needed to guarantee that there is a SPE where all firms join the lottery. One condition imposes that the lottery ticked must be low enough so that the lottery has positive demand in equilibrium. The other condition guarantees that each firm does not want to deviate and not join the lottery. In the next proposition states that firms may be worse of when lotteries are allowed.
Proposition 9
In the SPE where all the three firms also sell their goods through the lottery, firms may be worse off than in the absence of lotteries
With three firms, each firm can no longer block the appearance of a lottery since a lottery over the other two substitute goods can always be created. In this case firms may join the lottery even though they are worse off than in the absence of lotteries. This is because the outside option is no longer a market without lotteries, but instead a market where a lottery ticket over the other two firms' goods is also sold.
We next consider an alternative model where some consumers are relatively indifferent among all the three goods. We use an adapted version of the Spokes model, developed by Chen and Riordan (2007) , with three firms 14 . The model has the following structure. Starting at the midpoint (center) add lines of length 1 3 to form a network of 3 lines (spokes). Each spoke terminates at the center and originates at the other end. In order to have an equilibrium without lottery in this adapted Spokes model, we need to modify the linear transportation cost function c(x) = tx in the following way
Proposition 10 In a market with no lotteries the firms' price are p A = p B = p C = 2/3, and their profit is 0.22.
Consider now an external agent that allows the firms to sell the goods through a lottery, with equal probability of getting each good, at a price p L .
We consider a simple model where the external agent has market power by assuming that he is the only provider of lotteries 15 . The external agent sets a final price p L for the lottery with equal probability of getting each good, and asks the firms to join it. For each good sold through the lottery the external agent gets a commission fee C.
Proposition 11 i) There is an equilibrium in which the external agent offers a lottery at price p L = 0.59 and a commission fee C = . Firms choose to join the lottery and charge prices p A = p B = p C = 0.76. The firms' profit is 0.21.
ii) There is an equilibrium where no firms join the lottery.
Conclusion
In this paper we show that a multiproduct monopolist uses lotteries over its goods to maximize its profits. The optimal selling strategy depends on the shape of transportation costs. If the transportation costs function is concave, the multiproduct monopolist offers only one lottery with probability 1 2 . However, if the transportation costs function is convex, the optimal selling strategy includes a region of consumers, relatively indifferent between the goods, in which the monopolist offers a continuum of type contingent lotteries.
We then examine the use of lotteries in oligopolistic markets. We consider first a market with only two firms. Surprisingly, we show that if this market is fully covered, no lotteries are offered in equilibrium. However, when the market is not fully covered, lotteries can be sold in equilibrium.
With more than two firms, each firm no longer has a power to veto the creation of lottery, since a lottery can always be created with all other firms' products. We show that in this case even in a fully covered market, intermediaries might be able to sell lotteries. Interestingly, firms can be worse off than in the case where no lotteries are provided.
Appendixes
, which is a contradiction.
The second situation is when q(x) is strictly increasing somewhere. However, this cannot happen because it violates the incentive compatibility constraint of at least one type. If q(x) is strictly increasing somewhere, we must have some y and z, in the same neighborhood, such that y > z and q(y) > q(z). Suppose without loss of generality that y > z > 1 2 . This implies that u(y, q(z)) > u(y, q(y)) Hence, to satisfy type y's I.C. constraint we must have
Notice that y > z and q(y) > q(z) imply
Conditions (19) and (20) imply that we must have
However, condition (21) violates the I.C. constraint of type z. Hence, if y > z and q(y) > q(z) we cannot satisfy both type y and type z I.C. constraint.
Appendix B
The Spence-Mirlees condition is satisfied
> 0: this implies we can consider only the local incentive compatibility constraints for all types. For a fixed price, any lottery provides each type a different level of utility. Given that f is assumed to be convex, the function that relates the utility from a lottery and the types x is not monotonic in x. Still, for a given lottery q, the types can be ranked in terms of the utility they can get from that lottery: We call the lowest type for a lottery q the type that gets the lowest utility from that lottery. In order to maximize the profit, at least one lottery used in the optimal mechanism is going to be priced in such a way that the IR constraint of its lowest type binds 16 . Define x * * this type. What we show now is that, in the optimal mechanism, the IR constraints of all types x ≤ x * * have to bind. We prove that by contradiction. If both the IC and IR constraints bind for all types x ≤ x * * , the optimal mechanism would be a continuum of lotteries q (x) and corresponding prices p (x). Let's assume that there is a type x < x * * for which the IR constraint does not bind. Consider the case 17 in which x buys a lottery q such that q < q (x).
Given that we are assuming that x IR constraint does not bind, the price of that lottery has to be p (q) < V − qf (x) − (1 − q) f (1 − x). Given that x * * 's IR binds, q < q (x * * ), and there is a type x , x < x ≤ x * * , such that
Notice that x has to be lower than the value of x corresponding to the type that gets the highest utility from lottery q. Compare to the mechanism with q (x) and p (x), the new mechanism brings a gain equal to
16 Notice that, if f is concave, the lowest type fr any lottery q is x = Hence, in this region the price of a lottery with probability q(x) of getting good A is
The monopolist maximizes
Which is given by max x * * ,q
After simplifying and integrating by parts, we obtain max x * * ,q
Notice that now only the second integral depends on q(x). Maximizing the term under the second integral with respect to q(x) for all x > x * * , we
Expression (22) does not depend on q. Hence, for each x ∈ [x * * , 1] the expression is either positive or negative. If, for a given x, it is negative, then q(x) = 0. If it is positive, then q(x) is equal to the highest possible q, q = q(x * * ). The first-order condition with respect to x * * is
In order to determine the relation between p A and p L , we define the function
and we apply the Implicit Function Theorem 19 . We look for a function
Appendix D Let us consider the profit maximization problem of firm A, located at 0. The consumer x who is indifferent between buying good A and not buying any good is
19 In order to apply the Implicit function theorem, we need
The value x defines the demand for good A, all types below x prefer good A than no good. Firm A's maximization problem is given by
The first order condition gives
Appendix E If we expand the set of possible mechanisms that intermediaries can offer to the firms, then the no-lottery result no longer holds. Indeed, even in the context of a full covered market with two firms, there are lottery-like mechanisms that make both firms increase their profits compare to the status quo. A way to design such mechanisms is to choose rules in such a way that the competitive pressure between the firms is reduced, and, at the same time, price discrimination opportunities are created. We provide here a simple example in a context with linear transportation costs that illustrates the idea.
Proposition 12 A lottery-like mechanism that increases both firms profits is the following: two lotteries α and β with probability of getting good A,
− ε respectively (ε > 0 small) are sold at price p L = 1. The revenues of lottery α are entirely transferred to firm A, and the revenues from lottery β to firm B. In equilibrium the price of the goods are
is each firm's profit in this mechanism. Notice that this is higher than π comp = 1 2 , each firm's profit in the equilibrium with no lotteries.
The fact that two lotteries are used and full revenues of each lottery go directly to the firm for which the lottery would have represented the closest competitor 20 reduces the competition pressure on each firm. At the same time the lottery price set at the competitive equilibrium level guarantees price discrimination revenues. In equilibrium, we can expect that both firms coordinate and join the mechanism that guarantees them the highest possible profits.
Considering the concave transportation cost, we can use the monopolist's optimal mechanism as a benchmark. In that case, indeed, the optimal mechanism is simple and is implementable: the industry profit is maximized introducing a lottery in the market with the two goods. So far the mechanisms we have considered are such that the lotteries' prices are set in advance. Now we revert the procedure: the lotteries prices are function of the goods' prices. The fact that the prices of the lotteries depend on the prices of the goods and are inter-switched (the lottery price that depends on p B is the price of the lottery whose revenue goes to firm A, and vice-versa) takes care that there are no profitable strategies where one firm drops his price to undercut the lotteries and the competitor.
If the costs are convex, the optimal mechanism is more difficult to implement because of the presence of type contingent lotteries. This is a topic for future research.
Appendix F

Proof of Proposition 7
Consider a market without lotteries. Notice that the only difference between the standard Salop model and the MS model is on the utility of the least preferred good. However, in the neighborhood of a symmetric equilibrium , only the utility of the two most preferred goods is used to compute the firms' demand curve, which is the same in both models. Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium prices are the same in both models.
Proof of Proposition 8 Part a) of proposition 8:
No lottery tickets will be sold in the market if each firm has the following strategy:
-At time t=1, the firm does not accept to sell through any lottery -At time t=2, each firm chooses the optimal price p = 1/3 Next we will show that this set of strategies is a SPE. Notice that if firms follow this strategy no lotteries will be sold in the market.
At time t=2, firms choose the optimal price knowing that no lotteries are offered in the market. Hence, the optimal price, given by proposition 7, is p = 1/3.
At time t=1, no firm has an incentive to deviate and join a lottery at any price p L , since lottery tickets will only be sold if two or mores firms accept to sell through the lottery.
In this equilibrium the outcome is exactly the same as in the market where lotteries are not allowed.
Part b) of proposition 8: A lottery ticket over the three goods is sold in the market at price p L = p * , if firms strategies respect the following conditions:
-At time t=1 i) For p L < p * no firm accepts to sell through a lottery with 
-At time t=2, each firm choose its own optimal price given by
Next we will show that this set of strategies is a SPE. Notice that if all firms follow a strategy that respect the above conditions, then tickets of a lottery over the three goods at price p L = p * will be offered in the market.
We may have lotteries over three goods being offered in the market at price for p * < p L ≤ p * * . For p L > p * * lotteries over two goods or over three goods might be offered in the market. No lottery tickets are offered in the market for prices p L < p * .
At time t = 3, each consumer has to decide whether to buy the lottery ticket or instead to buy a good directly from the seller.
Condition i) guarantees that p * is the lowest price lottery over the three goods offered in the market. Condition iii) implies that if there is a lottery ticket over two goods it has a price p L > p * * . We can easily verify that at this price no consumer wants buy a lottery over just two goods. Therefore, we conclude that in this SPE, the only lottery consumers consider buying is the lottery over the three goods with price p L = p * . Consider a consumer located between A and B and let x denote the distance of this consumer to A. This consumer obtains the following expected utility from buying the lottery ticket with price p L :
The consumer indifferent between buying good A and the lottery ticket at price p L is given by the following condition:
Solving equation for x, we obtain
Hence, The demand for good i is given by
The demand for the lottery is
Where y and z are, respectively, the consumers indifferent between buying the lottery ticket and goods B and C. If we replace x for condition (25) and y and z for the equivalent expressions we obtain the following expression for the demand for the lottery
The total demand for the lottery, D L , is equally divided among the three firms.
At time t = 2 each firm chooses its optimal price after learning that the lottery over three goods with price p L is the lowest price lottery offered in the market.
Consider firm A maximization problem If we take the first order condition and then impose the symmetry condition, p A = p B = p C , we obtain that firm's optimal price is given by
Expression (27) gives firm's optimal price when the lottery over the three goods has positive demand in equilibrium. The lottery over the three goods has positive demand if 
At time t=1, firms simultaneously decide at which lottery prices they want to sell the good. To check if the set of strategies above is a SPE, we need to verify that firms don't want to deviate from those lottery prices.
Consider first part i) of the conditions on the firms strategies: If no firm accepts to sell at a lottery price p L < p * , then no firm wants to deviate and accept to sell at this price because a lottery will still not be offered in the market. Consider now part iii): If firms strategy imply that no firms accepts a lottery price p L > p * , then no firm wants to deviate and accept price p L because a lottery ticket will still not be sold. If they all accept at lottery prices p L ∈ (p * , p * * ], these lottery ticked will have no demand and if a firm deviates it has no impact on its profit. For prices p L > p * * no lottery will have positive demand in equilibrium and hence firms don't have incentive to deviate. Finally consider part ii): Suppose firm A deviates and does not accept selling at a lottery price p L = p * . Suppose no other lottery over the three goods is sold in this market. Then, firm i will compete with the other two firms and a lottery over the other two goods at price p L = p * . Consider a consumer located between A and B. The expected utility of buying a lottery ticket over goods B and C is given by
This consumer is indifferent between buying the lottery ticket BC and buying good A if
The demand for good A is as follows
At time t = 2, firm A chooses its optimal price, given the price of the lottery and that the other firms sell their good through the lottery. Firm A's profit is given by
Firm A's optimal price is given by
Replacing a in (31) we obtain the expression of firm's A profit when it deviates in function of the price of the lottery ticket
Firm A does prefers to join the lottery and not deviate if deviate the profit it obtains by joining the lottery, given by expression (26), is higher than the profit it obtain when firm A deviates, given by expression (31). This happens if and only if
Hence, if conditions (28) and (32) are satisfied there is an equilibrium where all the three firms join the lottery at time t=2.
We have shown that with more than two firms, lotteries can be sold even when in fully covered market where firms effectively compete against each other in the absence of lotteries.
Proof of Proposition 9
We provide an example in which firms join a lottery even though their profits are lower than in the absence of lotteries. Assume that k = 2, h = 0.1 and a SPE in which the minimal lottery price accepted by the three firms is p L = 0.2. In this case the conditions (28) and (32) are satisfied. Hence, there is a SPE where all firms join the lottery. Replacing k, h and p L in expression (29) we obtain that firms' profit when they join the lottery are π L3 = 0.09. In the absence of lotteries, firms's profits are π NL = 1/9. Notice that this SPE implies that firms sell their goods through the lottery even though their profits are lower than when lotteries are not allowed.
